On the Moral Limits of Conscription

It is generally assumed that states commit no moral wrong if they conscript some of their citizens into fighting a just war. In this project, I investigate the extent to which this widely held view is defensible. My working hypothesis is that there are tighter moral limits on conscription than is generally assumed. I reject the idea that there is a natural duty to fight in just wars, as we have neither a natural duty to defend ourselves, nor a duty to assist others in defending themselves at high cost to ourselves. I also consider, and reject, arguments from fair play to ground a special relationship-based duty to fight in just wars that we stand to benefit from. Importantly, I do not assume that using a draft system can never be morally justified. Instead, it is my working assumption that using such a system might sometimes be justified as the least evil, at least if the way the draft system is designed and implemented takes seriously, and manages to balance, considerations of efficiency and effectiveness with respect for the equal standing of all citizens.